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Secure buyer–seller watermarking protocol
J. Zhang, W. Kou and K. Fan
Abstract: In the existing watermarking protocols, a trusted third party (TTP) is introduced
to guarantee that a protocol is fair to both the seller and buyer in a digital content
transaction. However, the TTP decreases the security and affects the protocol implementa-
tion. To address this issue, in this article a secure buyer–seller watermarking protocol without
the assistance of a TTP is proposed in which there are only two participants, a seller and a
buyer. Based on the idea of sharing a secret, a watermark embedded in digital content to
trace piracy is composed of two pieces of secret information, one produced by the seller and
one by the buyer. Since neither knows the exact watermark, the buyer cannot remove the
watermark from watermarked digital content, and at the same time the seller cannot fabricate
piracy to frame an innocent buyer. In other words, the proposed protocol can trace piracy
and protect the customer’s rights. In addition, because no third party is introduced into the
proposed protocol, the problem of a seller (or a buyer) colluding with a third party to cheat
the buyer (or the seller), namely, the conspiracy problem, can be avoided.
1 Introduction
With the development of the Internet and e-commerce,
it is clear that digital copyright protection has become
an important issue. Digital watermarking has developed
as a promising technology for protecting digital copy-
right. In the past, many digital watermarking algorithms
have been proposed. The purpose of most of these
algorithms is simply to achieve the goal of protecting
digital copyright by embedding watermarks in digital
content. This is not enough. A secure watermarking
protocol is desirable [1–6] which uses the digital water-
marking technique and a public key cryptosystem to
protect the participants in a digital content transaction.
Recent research indicates that a secure watermarking
protocol should be able to resolve at least the following
problems:
 The piracy tracing problem: when a pirated copy
is found, an honest seller should be able to discover
the pirate, who is an original buyer, and to collect
undeniable proof against the buyer.
 The customer’s rights problem: a malicious seller
may fabricate piracy to frame an innocent buyer.
 The unbinding problem: a dishonest seller may
transplant a watermark embedded in a pirated copy into
a copy of higher-priced digital content to fabricate
piracy.
 The anonymity problem: if required, the identity of
a buyer should not be exposed unless he is proven to
have committed piracy.
 The conspiracy problem: on the one hand, a
malicious seller may collude with an untrustworthy
third party to fabricate piracy to frame an innocent
buyer; on the other hand, a malicious buyer may collude
with an untrustworthy third party to confound the
tracing of piracy by removing the watermark from
digital content.
Qiao and Nahrstedt [1] first pointed out that the
customer’s rights problem exists in the watermarking
protocols for tracing piracy. In [2], Memon and Wong
propose a watermarking protocol to simultaneously
resolve the piracy tracing problem and the customer’s
rights problem. In their scheme, watermark insertion is
performed in the encrypted domain. The seller cannot
access the watermarked digital content in its final form.
Therefore, he cannot fabricate piracy to frame a buyer.
In [3], Lei et al. address the unbinding problem. Their
watermarking protocol binds a watermark to a common
agreement (ARG) by the TTP’s signature, and the ARG
uniquely binds a particular transaction to a piece of
digital content. Under their scheme, the seller cannot
transplant the watermark embedded in a pirated copy
into a copy of higher-priced digital content. In addition,
the buyer can remain anonymous during the transaction
through applying in advance to a certification authority
(CA) for an anonymous certificate. In [4], Ju et al.
propose an anonymous watermarking protocol in which
a buyer can purchase digital content anonymously but
the anonymity can be controlled.
Although a TTP can guarantee that a protocol is fair
to both seller and buyer, the TTP decreases the security
and affects the implementation of the protocol. If a
third party introduced into a watermarking protocol is
untrustworthy, the conspiracy problem has to be
considered. Choi et al. [5] point out that in the existing
watermarking protocols a malicious seller can collude
with an untrustworthy third party to fabricate piracy to
frame an innocent buyer [1–4]. Based on commutative
cryptosystems, Choi et al. hope that a third party has no
idea about the watermark the buyer chooses, and thus a
seller cannot fabricate piracy even if he colludes with a
third party. However, Goi et al. [6] find that this goal
cannot be achieved through commutative cryptosys-
tems. Furthermore, we find that the protocol in [5] does
not take into account the collusion of a malicious
buyer with an untrustworthy third party to remove the
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watermark from watermarked digital content. The
conspiracy problem is still a bottleneck of the water-
marking protocol.
In this article, a secure buyer–seller watermarking
protocol derived from the one presented in [3] is pro-
posed. In the protocol, no assistance of a third party is
required, so that it avoids the conspiracy problem.
Based on the idea of sharing a secret, a watermark
embedded in digital content to trace piracy is composed
of two pieces of secret information, one produced by the
seller and one by the buyer. Since neither knows the
exact watermark, the buyer cannot remove the water-
mark from watermarked digital content, and the seller
cannot fabricate piracy to frame an innocent buyer.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows:
in Section 2, a general description of our watermarking
protocol is provided; an example of the proposed
protocol is described in Section 3, and the security of
the proposed protocol is analysed in Section 4. The
article concludes in Section 5 with discussions of future
avenues for research.
2 Secure buyer–seller watermarking protocol
In the proposed protocol, the interaction occurs only
between a buyer and a seller, and there is no other party
involved. Figure 1 shows a simplified trading model.
Based on the protocol presented by Lei et al. in [3], the
proposed protocol is similarly composed of three sub-
protocols: the registration protocol, the watermarking
protocol and the identification and arbitration protocol.
2.1 Registration protocol
If a buyer B wants to remain anonymous during
transactions, B randomly selects a key pair (pkB, skB)
and sends pkB to a trusted CA [3]. When the CA receives
pkB, it generates an anonymous certificate, CertCA(pkB),
and sends it back to B. Alternatively, if anonymity is not
necessary, B may skip the entire registration process and
use his normal digital certification.
2.2 Watermarking protocol
For a transaction, the buyer B and the seller S follow the
watermarking protocol shown in Fig. 2, which consists
of the following steps:
Step 1. B first negotiates with S to set up an agreement
(ARG) which explicitly states the rights and obligations
of both parties and specifies the digital content X. The
ARG uniquely binds this particular transaction to X
and can be regarded as a purchase order.
Step 2. B randomly selects a key pair (pk,sk) for
this transaction and generates a secret SECB. Then, B
signs the encrypted secret EPK(SECB) and ARG,
Signsk(Epk(SECB),ARG), and generates an anonymous
certificate, CertpkB(pk
). Finally, B transmits to S
CertCA(pkB), CertpkB(pk
), ARG, Epk(SECB), and
Signsk(Epk(SECB),ARG).
Step 3. Upon receiving CertCA(pkB), CertpkB(pk
),
ARG, Epk(SECB) and Signsk(Epk(SECB),ARG), S
verifies the validity of the certificates and signature. If
any of them is invalid, the transaction is aborted;
otherwise, S generates a unique watermark V for this
particular transaction and inserts it into X to get the
watermarked digital content X0, X0 ¼ X  V. Then, S
randomly generates a secret SECS. In the encrypted
domain, S obtains the encrypted watermark Epk(W) as
follows:
Epk ðWÞ ¼ Epk ðSECSÞ  Epk ðSECBÞ
¼ Epk ðSECS  SECBÞ
ð1Þ
where  denotes addition and  denotes multiplication
defined in the Galois field, respectively. S then inserts
the second-round watermark through the following
formula:
Epk ðX00Þ ¼ Epk ðX0Þ  Epk ðWÞ
¼ Epk ðX0 WÞ
ð2Þ
It is assumed that there exists a public key cryptosystem
that is a privacy homomorphism with respect to addi-
tion, so that the encryption function E can be used in
these equations. For example, the well-known Paillier
public key cryptosystem [7] is a privacy homomorphism
with respect to addition which can be used as a building
block in different applications. A public key crypto-
system proposed by Bresson et al. [8] can also be applied
to the above equations. Finally, S delivers Epk(X
00) to
B and stores V, CertCA(pkB), CertpkB(pk
), ARG,
Epk(SECB), Signsk(Epk(SECB),ARG) and SECS as a
new sales record with respect to the digital content X.
Step 4. After receiving Epk(X
00), B decrypts it to
obtain the correctly watermarked copy X00, X00 ¼ Dsk
(Epk(X
00)).
2.3 Identification and arbitration protocol
When a pirated copy Y of a certain digital content X is
found, the identification and arbitration protocol is used
to trace the pirate responsible and gather undeniable
evidence.
S first extracts from Y the watermark V0 inserted as
the first watermark during the watermarking protocol. S
then uses V0 as a keyword to search his sales records
with respect to X for a match. When a match is found, S
collects the associated information, X0 (X0 ¼ X  Vk,
where Vk is a keyword of the matched record), V,
CertCA(pkB), CertpkB(pk
), ARG, Epk(SECB),
Signsk(Epk (SECB),ARG) and SECS and sends them
along with Y to an arbitrator (ARB).
Upon receiving X’, V, CertCA(pkB), CertpkB(pk
),
ARG, Epk(SECB), Signsk(Epk(SECB),ARG), SECS
Buyer Seller
1. Sending out the purchase order
2. Making the delivery
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Fig. 2 Details of the proposed watermarking protocol
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and Y, ARB verifies the validity of the certificates
and the signature. If any of them is invalid, he rejects the
case. Otherwise, ARB sends CertCA(pkB), CertpkB(pk
)
and Epk(SECB) to the CA and asks the CA to decrypt
Epk(SECB). The CA orders B to do so, and sends SECB
to ARB. In case B refuses to do the decryption, or
cannot do so correctly, it is clear to ARB that B may be
the pirate. Then, ARB computes W ¼ SECB  SECS,
and runs the corresponding watermark detection and
extraction algorithm (with X’, W and Y as inputs) to
determine the existence of W in Y. If W is indeed found
in Y, ARB turns to the CA and asks for the real identity
behind pk. Once the identity of the buyer who owns
pk is revealed, ARB judges the buyer to be guilty and
closes the case. If W is not detected in Y, the buyer is
considered innocent, and his identity remains
unexposed.
3 An example of the proposed protocol
In this Section, a specific example of the proposed pro-
tocol is provided which uses a robust spread-spectrum
watermarking technique proposed by Cox et al. [9]
along with the Paillier cryptosystem [7].
Cox et al. [9] embed a set of independent real numbers
~W ¼ fw1;w2; . . . ;wmg drawn from N(0,1) into the
m largest DCT AC coefficients fx1; x2; . . . ; xmg of an
image X using a suitable insertion formula to yield
modified coefficients fx01; x02; . . . ; x0mg. For example, the
following insertion formula can be used:
x0i ¼ xi þ awi ð3Þ
where a is a small constant. Through the inverse DCT,
the watermarked image X0 can be obtained.
The Paillier cryptosystem in [7] operates in Zn2, where
n is the product of two very large primes p and q.
A message x is encrypted as
y ¼ EgðxÞ ¼ gxrn mod n2 ð4Þ
where g is the public key and r is random number (r< n).
The corresponding decryption function is
x ¼ DlðyÞ ¼ Lðy
l mod n2Þ
Lðgl mod n2Þmod n ð5Þ
where l is the private key and function L is defined as
L(u) ¼ (u 1)/n.
In the proposed protocol, the watermark W
embedded in a digital content is composed of the
buyer’s secret SECB and the seller’s secret SECS. It is
assumed that SECB and SECS are each chosen through
m independent random samples under the Gaussian
distribution N(0,1/2). Since the Paillier cryptosystem has
the property that
EðxÞEðyÞ ¼ Eðxþ yÞ ð6Þ
Epk(W) can be derived as follows:
Epk ðWÞ ¼ Epk ðSECBÞEpk ðSECSÞ
¼ Epk ðSECB þ SECSÞ
ð7Þ
It is assumed that
SECB ¼ fa secB1; a secB2; . . . ; a secBmg
SECS ¼ fa secS1; a secS2; . . . ; a secSmg
W ¼ a ~W ¼ faw1; aw2; . . . ; awmg
ð8Þ
the arbitrary element wi, (wi ¼ secBi þ secSi, i 2[1,m])
follows the Gaussian distribution N(0,1). The seller first
inserts the watermark V into the original image X to
yield a watermarked image X0. He then inserts the
watermark W into X0 as follows:
Epk ðX00Þ ¼ Epk ðX0ÞEpk ðWÞ
¼ Epk ðX0 þWÞ
ð9Þ
Note that each DCT coefficient of the digital content
and each element of W are real numbers, which are
represented with a fixed precision (e.g. 128 bits).
Finally, the seller sends the encrypted watermarked
image Epk(X
00) to the buyer. Upon receiving Epk(X00),
the buyer obtains the uniquely watermarked copy of X
by decrypting Epk(X
00) using his private key sk.
4 Security analyses
In this Section, the security of the proposed water-
marking protocol is analysed.
1. The secure buyer–seller watermarking protocol can
resolve all the problems presented in Section 1:
 For the piracy tracing problem, because B knows
only the secret SECB produced by himself and because B
has no knowledge of the original digital content X and
the watermark W, B is unable to remove the watermark
W from a watermarked digital content X00. In addition,
the proposed protocol provides mechanisms to unam-
biguously identify the guilty buyer once a pirated copy is
found.
 For the customer’s rights problem, because S
knows only the secret SECS produced by himself and
because he does not know the watermark W, S cannot
fabricate piracy to frame B, as S has no access to the
watermarked copy of the digital content in its final form.
 For the unbinding problem, because the signature
Signsk(Epk(SECB),ARG) explicitly binds SECB to
ARG, which uniquely specifies a particular digital
content X, it is impossible for S to transplant the
watermark into a copy of higher-priced digital content.
 For the anonymity problem, similar to the protocol
of Lei et al. [3], the anonymity of the buyer can be
retained during the transaction with the assistance of the
CA unless the buyer is judged by ARB to be guilty of
piracy.
 For the conspiracy problem, because no third party
is introduced into a digital content transaction in the
proposed protocol, the conspiracy problem is avoided.
2. In the proposed protocol, two watermarks V, and
W, are inserted into a piece of digital content. When a
pirated copy Y of a certain digital content X is found,
S will extract V from Y and use it as a keyword to search
his sales records with respect to X for a match. When a
match is found, S can decide which original buyer
produced the pirated copy and collect the associated
information against the pirate. Then, W as undeniable
evidence will be detected in Y by ARB to prove that the
pirate is indeed the original buyer.
In order to simultaneously resolve the piracy tracing
problem and the customer’s rights problem, neither the
seller nor the buyer should know the watermark W.
Based on the idea of sharing a secret, the watermark
W in the proposed protocol is composed of the buyer’s
secret and the seller’s secret. The Paillier cryptosystem
[7] has the property E(W) ¼ E(SECB)E(SECS) ¼
E(SECB þ SECS); that is, W ¼ SECB þ SECS. It is
IEE Proc.-Inf. Secur., Vol. 153, No. 1, March 2006 17
clear from this equation that the possibility of the seller
(or the buyer) guessing W is the same as the possibility
of guessing SECB (or SECS). Therefore, it is almost
impossible for the seller or the buyer to guess W.
The distortion of X00 can be controlled when two
watermarks, V and W, are embedded. First, with
knowledge of the original image X, S is able to choose
a watermark V such that it will not affect the quality of
X00. Second, generally speaking, each sample pair of
SECB and SECS (a pair of small real numbers) is far
smaller than DCT coefficients of digital content. There-
fore, each element of W is smaller than DCT coeffi-
cients, which will not significantly affect the quality of
X00. Furthermore, because without the knowledge of the
watermark W, S knows the distribution of W and X, he
can suggest a value of a to control the intensity of W,
which can effectively decrease the distortion of X00.
3. In this article, based on the method proposed in [3],
the anonymity of a buyer is retained. B applies to the
CA for anonymous certification, CertCA(pkB), which can
be used in multiple transactions. During a special
transaction, B randomly selects a one-time key pair
(pk,sk) and generates an anonymous certificate
CertpkB(pk
). Thus, B can use different key pairs for
different transactions, which will significantly increase
the security of a transaction.
For tracing piracy, the ARB requires the CA to
decrypt Epk(SECB). The CA requires B to do it, and
sends SECB to the ARB. Then the ARB can determine
whether the watermark W is in the digital content Y. If
W is indeed found in Y, the ARB rules that the buyer is
guilty and closes the case. If W is not detected in Y, the
buyer is considered innocent and his identity remains
unexposed. The anonymity of the buyer can be
controlled. It is clear from this article that there is no
watermark CA. In other words, the proposed protocol is
simpler than that in [3]. As the trade-off, the anonymity
of the buyer is weaker than that provided in [3].
4. Compared with the existing watermarking proto-
cols, the interaction in the proposed protocol occurs
only between a buyer and a seller, which is closer to
reality. In addition, the number of rounds of interaction
and the amount of data transmitted in the proposed
protocol are greatly reduced.
5 Conclusion
In this article, based on the protocol of Lei et al. [3] a
secure buyer–seller watermarking protocol is proposed,
without the assistance of a TTP, in which there are
only two participants, a seller and a buyer. The
proposed protocol can simultaneously resolve the piracy
tracing problem, the customer’s rights problem, the
unbinding problem, the anonymity problem and the
conspiracy problem. Since no third party is introduced,
the proposed protocol is simpler and more secure than
the existing watermarking protocol. However, there is a
drawback in the proposed protocol; that is, the buyer’s
assistance is required to resolve the piracy dispute. We
wish to improve this in the future research.
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